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The Ukrainian Parliament has voted to remove the country’s president Viktor Yanukovych from office, with
an arrest warrant also being issued over his role in the death of protesters last week. Javier
Morales writes on the complexities of Ukrainian society, arguing that without acknowledging the
country’s ethno-linguistic and cultural divisions we run the risk of underestimating the
consequences of recent events. He writes that any new political leadership will need to take on
board the interests of all citizens, including those in eastern and southern regions who have
supported Yanukovych.
The images that we received from the protests in Ukraine, tragically marked by the high number of
victims, do not properly reflect the complexity of the conflict. Although the overarching narrative is partly correct, we
risk omitting other facts that present a much more contradictory reality – one that is far from the romanticism that is
apparent to those who are looking toward the country for the first time.
First, by focusing on the capital (the events at the Maidan square and the surrounding area) we obscure the
substantial regional diversity in Ukraine, which is not represented in Kyiv. To summarise, we can describe the
Ukrainian society as being divided between the western and central regions (including the capital), which identify
the Ukrainian nation with the Ukrainian language and vote for the opposition parties leading the protests; and the
eastern and southern regions, where the Russian-speaking population combine their Ukrainian identity with Russian
culture, and most support President Yanukovych’s party. The geographic distribution of votes in the 2010
presidential election, shown in Figure 1, matches the ethno-linguistic divide in the country, shown in Figure 2, and is
explained by it to a great extent.
Figure 1: Geographic distribution of votes in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election
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Figure 2: Ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine
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Source: Wikimedia Commons (Credit: Yerevanci; CC-BY-SA-3.0)
Although the protest movement has attracted demonstrators from outside Kyiv, and has also spread to other parts of
Ukraine, the geographic divide remains. For example, the victims among the opposition (according to their own
data, fig. 3) came from the western and central regions; while the police officers that were killed came from the
centre and east.
Figure 3: Place of origin of individuals killed during the Ukraine protests
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Note: Fatalities on the side of the protesters are shown by the Ukrainian flags, while fatalities
on the side of the police/security forces are shown with the round badge. Source:
Euromaidan
This polarisation does not allow us to speak of a united nation against the government. A significant proportion of
Ukrainian society opposes the Maidan’s demands, with 70 per cent in eastern regions and 80 per cent in southern
regions against it, compared to only 20 per cent in the west. However, dissatisfaction with Yanukovych’s
management of the crisis has also risen among his own supporters. Yanukovych is an undoubtedly corrupt politician
with little inclination to dialogue – as a young man he was sent to Soviet prisons twice for theft and assault. Yet, in
spite of his responsibility for the repression, he was still a democratically-elected president that obtained 49 per cent
of the votes only four years ago, in an election that was deemed free and fair by international observers.
For people in the eastern part of the country, his Party of Regions represents the protection of their interest vis-à-vis
those in the west – who, in their opinion, are discriminating against them because of their ethno-linguistic
differences. Any political solution to the conflict should necessarily take the views of this part of Ukrainian society into
account or accept the risk of fracturing the country for good.
Within the opposition that is now taking power, we find several actors with contradictory objectives. As we know, the
protest, which renamed Kyiv’s Independence Square as the ‘Euromaidan’, was sparked by the president’s decision
not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This was interpreted by many citizens as the end to their
aspirations of prosperity as future EU members, although full EU membership had not been offered at any time by
Brussels. The first mobilisation represented an indignant society against the rampant corruption of their government,
allied with business oligarchs to exploit a country in serious economic crisis.
Even then, it was evident that the Maidan was a very heterogeneous movement: the political parties that led the
demonstrations represented ideological views ranging from Fatherland or UDAR in the centre-right, to the
ultranationalism of Freedom (Svoboda). While the leaders of the first two parties, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and former
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boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, could be seen by the US and Europe as a democratic alternative; Svoboda’s
leader Oleh Tyahnybok was associated with a xenophobic discourse that clearly contradicted EU values.
The Maidan’s more recent turn to violence was the result of Yanukovych’s authoritarian decision to restrict the right
to public protest, using new legislation that was later cancelled, but at the time convinced many demonstrators that
there was no point in sticking to peaceful action. In this new climate, new groups started rising: the far-right Right
Sector (Praviy Sektor) organised the Maidan’s paramilitary ‘self-defence’ unit, while its leaders gave interviews to
Western journalists declaring that they were armed and planning to take power by force through a nationalist
revolution that would eliminate all Russian influence in the country. Football hooligans, known as ultras, also joined
the protest as protection against the titushki: the government-sponsored thugs that helped the police in the
repression.
This ultranationalist minority negatively influenced the protest: urban guerrilla tactics like petrol bombs were
widespread and a few demonstrators were seen using firearms. On the other side, indiscriminate killings by police
snipers caused many civilian casualties and created an ideal setting for radicalisation, uniting the protesters in the
face of tragedy and encouraging them to keep fighting. At the same time, the opposition parties’ influence in the
Maidan decreased, as the movement started to follow its own dynamics rather than orders from above.
In the short term, the possible future scenarios are highly volatile. The agreement reached through the mediation of
several European ministers became obsolete the day after it was signed: Yanukovych and other high-ranking
officials fled the capital, while the opposition’s deputies started to pass new legislation in parliament. The greatest
risk is that none of these actors – not even the EU or Russia, whose influence on the ground is limited – will manage
to fully control the situation. Even if Klitschko, Yatsenyuk or the recently freed Yulia Tymoshenko, who is apparently
returning to active politics despite her health problems, became the new leader of the country, this would not
necessarily be accepted by all protesters. Many, including the far-right minority, do not feel represented by
politicians who they also perceive as corrupt and distant from their fight in the streets.
With regard to the Russian-speaking regions in the east and south, if they feel marginalised from the decision-
making process by the new authorities they could start their own protest movement, or even take steps towards their
independence. A future of entrenched civil conflict would, unfortunately, be much closer to a tragedy for the whole
country than to an epic victory for one side.
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